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INTRODUCTION
Section 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code codifies a principle known as the
“absolute priority rule.” The absolute priority rule requires that creditors receive payment in
full before holders of equity can receive or retain any property under a plan of
reorganization.1 The absolute priority rule ensures that a plan of reorganization will not be
used to allow equity to benefit at the cost of higher-priority unsecured debt.2 If left
unchecked, a small number of insiders, whether representatives of management or major
creditors, may use the reorganization process to gain an unfair advantage.3 Chapter 11 cases
with individual debtors magnifies this problem. As originally conceived, chapter 11 was
never intended for use by individual debtors.4 Courts have struggled to find the proper
balance in applying many of chapter 11’s corporate oriented provisions–including the
absolute priority rule–to actual individual debtors.5
In 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”). BAPCPA amended chapter 11 by expanding the
bankruptcy estate in individual chapter 11 cases to include post-commencement property
and earnings. Due to the poor drafting of certain BAPCPA amendments,6 the exception
language in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) is susceptible to two different interpretations. The first,
popularly termed the “broad view,” abrogates the absolute priority rule in individual chapter
11 cases.7 The second, termed the “narrow view,” makes the absolute priority rule apply
only to an individual debtor’s pre-petition property.8


J.D. University of Tennessee College of Law
Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1999).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 444.
4 Wamsganz v. Boatmen’s Bank of De Sota, 804 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1986).
5 See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 161 (1991) (holding that an individual debtor not engaged in
business is eligible to reorganize under chapter 11); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S.
197, 202 (1988) (holding that the absolute priority rule barred chapter 11 debtors’ retention of equity
interest in a farm over the objections of creditors holding senior unsecured claims).
6 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1115, 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
7 See In re Friedman, 466 B.R. 471, 484 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012); SPCP Grp., LLC v. Biggins, 465 B.R.
316, 322 (M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 868 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010); In re Johnson, 402 B.R.
851, 852-53 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2009); In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. 477, 480 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007); In re
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This article argues that the principles of statutory construction favor the narrow
view. First, a plain reading of the statute supports this interpretation. Second, the overall
context of the Bankruptcy Code supports the narrow view. The legislative history involved
is sparse at best and is generally not helpful in determining Congress’s intent on the issue.
As a result, the preexisting bankruptcy practice–the narrow view–should prevail.
I.

INDIVIDUAL CHAPTER 11 CASES

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code enables an insolvent debtor to reorganize its
financial affairs to pay back its creditors over a period of time.9 If the court confirms the
debtor’s plan for reorganization, the debtor may continue business operations, paying back
its creditors over time according to the specifics of the plan.10 Most chapter 11 cases are
filed by business entities; however, a smaller percentage11 of cases are filed by “wealthy”
individuals who have significant assets that they wish to save.12 Individuals with regular
income who owe large amounts of debt are ineligible to file under chapter 13.13 These
individuals must either liquidate under chapter 7 or reorganize under chapter 11.14 Due to
the means test imposed on chapter 7 by section 707(b), chapter 11 is the only available
chapter for individuals who both owe large amounts of debt and possess an above-median
regular income.15

Roedemeier, 374 B.R. 264, 276 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007); In re Bullard, 358 B.R. 541, 544 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2007).
8 See In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d 558, 575 (4th Cir. 2012); In re Arnold, 471 B.R. 578, 607 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2012); In re Kamell, 451 B.R. 505, 512 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011); In re Gbadebo, 431 B.R. 222, 230
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010).
9 JONATHAN P. FRIEDLAND, MICHAEL L. BERNSTEIN, GEORGE W. KUNEY & JOHN D. AYER,
CHAPTER 11 - 101: THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF CHAPTER 11 PRACTICE: A PRIMER 4 (H. Slayton
Dabney, Jr. & John W. Kibler eds., 2007) (“A chapter 11 case allows the debtor to preserve the
business as a going concern, and thereby maximize value for creditors, shareholders, employees and
other stakeholders.”).
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123.
11 In 2011, there were 9,772 chapter 11 business filings and 1,757 chapter 11 nonbusiness filings. U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts--Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12
Month Period Ending December 31, 2011, UNITED STATES COURTS (June 16, 2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2011/1211_f2
.pdf.
12 Toibb, 501 U.S. at 166 (“The plain language of the Bankruptcy Code permits individual debtors not
engaged in business to file for relief under Chapter 11.”).
13 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
14 Id.
15 Individual debtors whose current monthly income is greater than that of the median family income
of their state and who owe $360,475 or more in unsecured debts or $1,081,400 or more in secured
debts can only file for chapter 11. Id. §§ 109(e), 707(b).
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A.

The Bankruptcy Estate in Individual Chapter 11 Cases

The commencement of a case creates a bankruptcy estate.16 For individual debtors
in chapter 11 cases, two sections of the Bankruptcy Code define what property to include in
the bankruptcy estate. Property of the estate is defined in section 541 and can be
summarized as “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.”17 In individual chapter 11 cases, section 1115 adds the
debtor’s post-commencement earnings and any property acquired by the debtor postcommencement to the bankruptcy estate.18 Upon confirmation of the plan, property of the
estate revests in the possession of the debtor, who then performs the plan, unless the plan
itself provides otherwise.19
The Bankruptcy Code protects the estate in several ways. First, the automatic stay
protects the estate from creditors.20 The automatic stay is effective immediately upon the
filing of a petition for relief and prohibits nearly all collection efforts.21 Second, the estate is
protected from actions of the debtor acting as the debtor in possession.22 These statutes
place limits on what a debtor in possession can do with property of the estate. Some of
these provisions bar the debtor in possession from using certain assets without prior
permission of the court.23 Other provisions require the debtor in possession to protect the
interest of secured parties24 while still others provide procedural safeguards for taking on
additional debt.25
B.

Confirming a Chapter 11 Plan

The chapter 11 plan determines the amount that each claimholder receives in an
individual chapter 11 case.26 Debtors have a statutory right to propose a plan before any
creditor or claimholder may do so.27 A plan must meet the requirements laid out in section
1129 before it can be confirmed by the court.28 In every chapter 11 plan, claimholders are

Id. § 541 (“The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an
estate.”).
17 Id. § 541(a)(1) (emphasis added).
18 Id. § 1115(a).
19 Id. § 1141.
20 Id. § 362(a).
21 Id.
22 Id. § 1107.
23 Id. § 363.
24 Id. § 361.
25 Id. § 364.
26 See id. § 1123.
27 Id. § 1121(b) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, only the debtor may file a plan until
after 120 days after the date of the order for relief under this chapter.”).
28 Id. § 1129.
16
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grouped into classes based on the similarity of their claims.29 For a plan to be confirmed by
the court, each impaired class must accept the plan or receive under the plan as much as it
would receive under a chapter 7 liquidation.30 This requirement is satisfied in three different
ways: (1) by leaving a class unimpaired, (2) by acquiring the required votes from the class
members, or (3) by forcing a class to accept the plan.31 Unimpaired classes32 are deemed to
accept the plan automatically.33 A class that receives nothing under the plan is conclusively
presumed not to accept the plan.34 All other claimholders vote on the proposed plan.35 If
claimholders numbering more than one-half in number and holding at least two-thirds in
amount36 in a class accept the plan, the plan is considered accepted by that particular class.37
A non-accepting class can be bound by a plan using section 1129(b).38
C.

Cramming Down Unsecured Claimholders

Forcing a plan on a dissenting class of claimholders is commonly referred to as a
“cram down.”39 For a cram down to occur, the plan (1) must not discriminate unfairly
against the objecting classes and (2) must be fair and equitable.40 A plan satisfies the unfair

Id. § 1122.
Id. § 1129(a)(7).
31 Id. §§1129(a)(7), (b)(2)(B).
32 A claim or interest is impaired if any of the rights of the holder’s interest will be changed or affected
by the plan. See id. § 1124.
33 Id. §§ 1126(c), (f).
34 Id. § 1126(g).
35 Id. § 1126.
36 Only voting class members are factored in the calculation. For example, a class containing 100
claimholders and holding a total of $1,000,000 in allowed claims in which only 12 claimholders
holding a total of $120,000 vote, a minimum of 7 claimholders holding a total of at least $80,000
worth of claims is needed in order for the entire class of 100 claimholders to accept the plan.
37 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
38 See id. § 1129(b).
39 St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 347 U.S. 298, 322 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“If
that percentage of creditors and stockholders does not approve the plan the judge . . . may
nevertheless approve the plan. This is the so-called ‘cram down’ provision . . . .”); Jack Friedman,
What Courts Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Cram Down, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1495, 1496 (1993)
(“Colloquially, this power is called ‘cram down.’ It is the common parlance used by judges and
practitioners when referring to the forcing of modifications down the throat of an unwilling party.”).
40 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
29
30
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discrimination test by treating similar claims or equity interests in a like manner.41 A plan is
fair and equitable if it meets the requirements of section 1129(b)(2).42
A court may perform a cram down on a class of unsecured claims provided that the
plan meets the criteria set out in section 1129(b)(2)(B), which states:
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
...
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims—
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such
class receive or retain on account of such claim property of
a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the
allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the
claims of such class will not receive or retain under the
plan on account of such junior claim or interest any
property, except that in a case in which the debtor is an
individual, the debtor may retain property included in the
estate under section 1115, subject to the requirements of
subsection (a)(14) of this section.43
A class of unsecured claims can be crammed down in two different ways. In the
first method, claimholders are paid in an amount equal to the present value of the full
amount of their claim, either on the effective date or over time. 44 The second method
allows unsecured creditors to be paid in part or not at all, so long as the plan does not violate
the absolute priority rule.45 The absolute priority rule ensures that “the holder of any claim

In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 121 (D. Del. 2006) (“Traditionally, courts applied
a four-factor test to determine unfair discrimination. The factors considered are: (1) whether the
discrimination is supported by a reasonable basis; (2) whether the debtor could consummate the plan
without the discrimination; (3) whether the discrimination is proposed in good faith; and (4) the
relationship between the discrimination and its basis or rationale.”); Denise R. Polivy, Unfair
Discrimination in Chapter 11: A Comprehensive Compilation of Current Case Law, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191,
203-07 (1998).
42 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (“For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements . . .”).
43 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i-ii).
44 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i).
45 See G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. et. al., Review of the Proposals of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
Pertaining to Business Bankruptcies: Part One, 53 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1406 (1998) (“The phrase ‘fair and
equitable’ is a term of art that expressly incorporates the so-called ‘absolute priority rule.’ . . . In
41
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or interest that is junior to the claims of [the impaired unsecured] class will not receive or
retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property.”46 Courts,
practitioners, and academics often use the term “absolute priority rule” as a short hand
reference to the requirements codified in section 1129(b)(2). For a cram down to occur, the
absolute priority rule bars holders of equity–typically shareholders in a corporate
reorganization–from remaining owners unless general unsecured creditors are paid in full.47
Shareholders’ equity interests are cancelled, and new equity is issued to unsecured creditors
or new investors providing capital to the reorganization.48
D.

The Absolute Priority Rule in Individual Chapter 11 Cases

The absolute priority rule can be harsh because owners generally must give up their
equity interests in order to cram down a chapter 11 plan.49 Some courts allow equity holders
to retain their equity interests in chapter 11 cases so long as they provide “new value” equal
to the amount of the retained equity.50 The case law regarding this “new value exception”
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.51 To benefit from the new value exception,
individual debtors must usually convince an outsider to loan them money in order to
contribute the new value.52 If the individual debtor has substantial exempt assets53 to

essence, the purpose of the rule is to preserve the value of senior claims over junior claims and
interests.”).
46 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526
U.S. 434, 441-42 (1999).
47 See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988). “[T]he absolute priority rule
‘provides that a dissenting class of unsecured creditors must be provided for in full before any junior
class can receive or retain any property [under a chapter 11] plan.’” Id. (citations omitted).
48 Richard Maloy, A Primer on Cramdown–How and Why It Works, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 30-43
(2003).
49 Stanley E. Goldich, Plain-Meaning Rules: Did BAPCPA Abolish the Absolute-Priority Rule?, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., June 2012, at 34 (“However, even with the ‘new value exception,’ meeting the absolutepriority rule has often been impossible for individual debtors whose assets are already part of the
estate and who, unlike shareholders of a corporation, do not usually have other sources of capital to
contribute.”).
50 LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 443, 449 (neither confirming nor denying the existence of the new value
corollary to the absolute priority rule); In re Bonner Mall P’ship, 2 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the new value exception to the absolute priority rule survived enactment of Bankruptcy
Code); In re Bryson Properties, XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 504-05 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that a plan
permitting limited partners to make new capital contributions was not fair and equitable to debtor’s
unsecured claim); In re Outlook/Century, Ltd., 127 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding
that any new value exception to the absolute priority rule did not survive enactment of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
51 See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
52 See In re Draiman, 450 B.R 777, 822-23 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011); In re Henderson, 341 B.R. 783, 79091 (M.D. Fla. 2006); In re East, 57 B.R. 14, 19 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
53 An IRA, a 401k, or equity in an exempt homestead are all examples of exempt assets that an
individual debtor could borrow against to provide new value. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(b), 544 (2012).
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borrow against or can find a sympathetic, non-insider benefactor, then the debtor can retain
her ownership interest by providing new value equal to the value of the ownership interest.54
Courts developed55 the absolute priority rule in reaction to the twentieth century practice of
selling of railroads via receiverships.56 This requirement, that plans of reorganization be “fair
and equitable,” was later codified in section 77B of the former Bankruptcy Act and in its
successor, Chapter X.57 Drafters of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code continued with the fair and
equitable requirement in the cram down provisions of section 1129(b).58
Courts have wrestled with how to apply the absolute priority rule to individual
debtors in chapter 11 cases.59 Originally, the absolute priority rule was never designed to
The new ownership interest (usually common stock) must be market tested, i.e. auctioned off; this
requirement is designed to protect against a plan giving equity in the reorganized company of value
greater than the consideration paid. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 453-54, 458; see also Nicholas L.
Georgakopoulos, New Value, After Lasalle, 20 BANKR. DEVS. J. 1, 8-9 (2003) (“Before LaSalle, new
value plans routinely gave the right to buy the new equity to specified buyers. If a plan gave the old
equityholders the right to buy equity in the reorganized firm, that right tended to be exclusive. No
other buyers were allowed to outbid the old equityholders. Such plans would violate LaSalle.”). The
protections provided by the “market test” can be irrelevant to individuals and closely held
corporations filing for chapter 11. James B. Haines, Jr. & Philip J. Hendel, No Easy Answers: Small
Business Bankruptcies After BAPCPA, 47 B.C. L. REV. 71, 99 (2005) (“Is it relevant to creditor interests
whether the reorganization plan of an electrician with four employees offers others an equal chance to
purchase the ‘equity’ of the debtor corporation? Realistically, the market for this equity is ‘virtually
nonexistent’ because most companies have little or no value after their owner-managers have been
ousted by the hypothetical high bidder.”).
55 John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 969-79 (1989). The
principle was ensconced by Justice William O. Douglas in Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co. by tying the
absolute priority rule to the words “fair and equitable” in section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. 308
U.S. 106, 115-19 (1939). Hence, the current requirement in § 1129(b)(1) that a plan must be “fair and
equitable.”
56 See generally Ayer, supra note 55, at 969-79 (explaining how the absolute priority rule arose in the
context of railroad equity receiverships).
57 LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 444.
58 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012) (“[I]f all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this
section other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court shall confirm the plan
notwithstanding the requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is
fair and equitable . . . .”).
59 Compare In re Gosman, 282 B.R. 45, 49 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that the debtor could not
confirm his plan by means of cramdown over a dissenting class of unsecured creditors while at same
time retaining exempt property), and In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. 91, 94-95 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989)
(holding that the debtor’s plan, which did not propose to pay unsecured creditors the full amount of
their allowed claims and which proposed that the debtor retain both exempt and non-exempt assets,
did not satisfy the absolute priority rule,), with In re Henderson, 321 B.R. 550, 561 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2005) (holding that the debtor’s plan did not violate the absolute priority rule because a total
liquidation of all of the debtor’s assets was not required in order for a plan to be fair and equitable to
dissenting creditors who were subject to cramdown), aff’d 341 B.R. 783 (M.D. Fla. 2006). See generally
David S. Jennis & Kathleen L. DiSanto, Application of Absolute-Priority Rule and New-Value Exception in
Individual Chapter 11s, AM. BANKR. INST. 56 J., July/August 2011.
54
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apply to individuals, which is also true of chapter 11.60 Nevertheless, nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code prohibits an individual debtor in a chapter 11 case from using the cram
down provisions in section 1129(b).61 Consequently, courts struggle to adapt these
provisions to individual bankruptcy petitioners.62 For example, no consensus exists on
whether the absolute priority rule applies to exempt property.63 Businesses are not entitled
to exempt property whereas individuals are.64 The cram down provisions of section 1129(b)
state in part:
[T]he condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class
includes the following requirements: . . . [w]ith respect to a class of
unsecured claims . . . the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the
claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of
such junior claim or interest any property . . . .”65
The term “any property,” as used in section 1129(b) is not limited in any way. 66 However,
section 522(c) states that “[exempt property] is not liable during or after the case for any
debt of the debtor that arose . . . before the commencement of the case . . . .” 67 Prior to
BAPCPA,68 the majority of courts to consider the matter viewed a plan as failing the fair and
equitable test of section 1129(b)(2) if an individual debtor retains any exempt property under

See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 167 (1991) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“The repeated references to
the debtor’s ‘business,’ ‘the operation of the debtor’s business,’ and the ‘current or former
management of the debtor’ make it abundantly clear that the principal focus of the chapter is upon
business reorganizations.”); see also Wamsganz v. Boatmen’s Bank of De Sota, 804 F.2d 503, 505 (8th
Cir. 1986) (holding that “persons who were not engaged in business could not seek relief under
Chapter 11”), abrogated by Toibb, 501 U.S. at 157.
61 In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 862 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (“[B]efore 2005, the authorities were pretty
much in agreement that the absolute priority rule applied to individuals in chapter 11.”).
62 See Haines & Hendel, supra note 54, at 97 (reporting the results of a 1996 survey that stated “eighty
percent of those polled–debtors’ and creditors’ attorneys alike–supported the proposition that the
bankruptcy court should be able to confirm a plan even though no impaired class accepts it”).
63 Luis Salazar, Too Rich for Bankruptcy: Some Pitfalls of Chapter 11 Filings by Individuals, 9 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 527, 528 (2000) (“[I]ndividuals trying to confirm plans of reorganization have encountered the
question of whether the absolute priority rule is broad enough to include even their exempt
property.”).
64 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2012) (“[A]n individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate
the property listed in either paragraph (2) or, in the alternative, paragraph (3) of this subsection.”).
65 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
66 In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. at 95 (“The Code section makes no distinction between exempt and
nonexempt property nor as to value.”).
67 Id. § 522(c).
68 The majority/minority distinction was upset by BAPCPA due to the uncertainty caused by the
addition of § 1115 and the amendment to § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). A broad reading of § 1115 would
supersede the majority view and settle the matter, while a narrow reading of § 1115 would keep the
majority/minority distinction intact.
60
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the plan69 while a minority held that individual debtors may keep exempt property as part of
a plan without violating the absolute priority rule.70 A majority of courts read the phrase
“any property” in section 1129(b) as an unlimited term applied specifically to plan
confirmation that overrides the more general reference in section 522.71 The minority view
turns that analysis on its head, finding section 522 to be the specific provision that overrides
the general rule in section 1129(b) that applies to all chapter 11 cases.72
Congress has never attempted to clean up these issues through legislation.73 In
2005, when Congress passed BAPCPA, section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) was among the number of
provisions amended. Unfortunately, section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and others74 were poorly
drafted, leading to much confusion.
II.

DOES THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE APPLY TO INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS
AFTER BAPCPA?

As previously mentioned, the 109th Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.75 BACPA made numerous changes to
the Bankruptcy Code, some impacting individual chapter 11 debtors.76 Section 1129(b)(2)
was amended by adding the following emphasized language to the end of section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii):
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
...
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims—
In re Fross, 233 B.R. 176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1999); In re Gosman, 282 B.R. at 50; In re Yasparro, 100
B.R. 91; In re East, 57 B.R. at 19.
70 In re Steedley, No. 09-50654, 2010 WL 3528599, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2010); In re
Henderson, 321 B.R. at 560.
71 In re Gosman, 282 B.R. at 51-52 (“[T]he reference to ‘any property’ means any and all property,
including property of the estate. Such a broad term clearly overrides the mandate of Section 522 or
any other provisions relating to exemptions.”).
72In re Henderson, 321 B.R. at 558 (“The [d]ebtor’s right to claim exemptions is governed by Section
522 of the Code. This Section is applicable to all operating Chapters including a Chapter 11 case . . . .
It is equally clear the [d]ebtor’s right to claim exemption under Chapter 11 is expressly recognized by
11 U.S.C. § 1123(c) of the Code.”).
73 See Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding on to Cars, Homes and Other
Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 457-58 (2005) (“Absent corrective
legislation, the courts and bankruptcy lawyers will struggle with the many ambiguities and nonsensical
twists of the 2005 Act for years to come.”).
74 See infra note 164.
75 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.
23 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA].
76 Id.
69
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(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such
class receive or retain on account of such claim property of
a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the
allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the
claims of such class will not receive or retain under the
plan on account of such junior claim or interest any
property, except that in a case in which the debtor is an individual,
the debtor may retain property included in the estate under section
1115, subject to the requirements of subsection (a)(14) of this
section.77
BAPCPA also added a new section, section 1115,78 which reads:
(a) In a case in which the debtor is an individual, property of the estate
includes, in addition to the property specified in section 541—
(1) all property of the kind specified in section 541 that the debtor
acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is
closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13,
whichever occurs first; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the
commencement of the case but before the case is closed,
dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13,
whichever occurs first.
(b) Except as provided in section 1104 or a confirmed plan or order
confirming a plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of
the estate.79
The new exception language in section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) allows an individual debtor to retain
property included in the estate under section 1115.80 Section 1115(a) enlarges the
bankruptcy estate by including two kinds of post-commencement property. These two types
of property are “in addition to” the kinds of property specified in section 541.81 Section
1115(b) gives the debtor the right to remain in possession of the estate’s property except in

11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
BAPCPA § 321(a).
79 11 U.S.C. § 1115.
80 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Section (a)(14) deals with the payment of post petition domestic support
obligations and is irrelevant to issues dealing with the absolute priority rule or property of the estate.
See id. §§ 1129(a)(14), (b)(2)(B)(ii).
81 Id. § 1115(a).
77
78
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instances where a trustee is appointed under section 1104 or a confirmed plan (or order
confirming a plan) provides for otherwise.82
A.

Two Interpretations

Courts are split as to whether the absolute priority rule applies to individual debtors
due to the awkward language used in sections 1115 and 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).83 Two
interpretations exist. The first, termed the “broad view,” favors an expansive reading of
section 1115 in which section 1115 subsumes and supersedes section 541 in defining
property of the estate.84 Under the broad view, “property included in the estate under
section 1115”85 includes: (1) pre-petition property; (2) property acquired by the debtor postcommencement; and (3) post-commencement earnings of the debtor.86 The broad view
would abrogate the absolute priority rule for individual debtors because the exception in
section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) would apply to all property87 in the bankruptcy estate. The second
interpretation, termed the “narrow view,” favors a restricted reading of section 1115.88 The
phrase “in addition to the property specified in section 541” is merely a cross-reference.89
Under the narrow view, “property included in the estate under section 1115” includes only
two categories of property: (1) property acquired by the debtor post-commencement and (2)
post-commencement earnings of the debtor.90 The narrow view applies the absolute priority
rule only to pre-petition property because section 1115 includes only two kinds of postcommencement property.
B.

Analytic Framework Used by Courts

Most courts that considered the issue employed some type of statutory
interpretation analysis.91 The remaining courts, which failed to provide significant analysis
Id. § 1115(b).
In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d 558, 563 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A significant split of authorities has developed
nationally among the bankruptcy courts regarding the effect of the BAPCPA amendments on the
absolute priority rule when the Chapter 11 debtor is an individual.”).
84 See In re Friedman, 466 B.R. 471, 482 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012); SPCP Group, LLC v. Biggins, 465 B.R.
316, 322 (M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Shat, 424 B.R. at 865; In re Johnson, 402 B.R. 851, 852 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 2009); In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. 477, 480 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007); In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. 264,
276 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007); In re Bullard, 358 B.R. 541, 544 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007).
85 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
86 Id. §§ 541, 1115(a).
87 The subsets of pre-petition property and post-petition property together comprise the entire set of
the property of the estate in an individual chapter 11 case.
88 See In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d at 565-66 (discussing courts that have followed the narrow view).
89 See Id.; In re Arnold, 471 B.R. 578, 606 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2012); In re Kamell, 451 B.R. 505, 510-12
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011); In re Gbadebo, 431 B.R. 222, 230 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010).
90 See supra note 89.
91 E.g., In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d at 568-69; In re Friedman, 466 B.R. at 480-82; In re Lindsey, 453 B.R.
886, 892-94 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2011); In re Shat, 424 B.R. at 864-65.
82
83
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on the issue, identified the issue, summarized previous cases, and stated the most persuasive
view.92 Despite the split of authorities, courts mostly agree as to which canons of statutory
interpretation govern.93 Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code begins with the language of
the statute itself.94 A statute must be read in context and viewed within the overall statutory
scheme.95 Where the statute’s language is plain, no further analysis is required96 so long as
the plain interpretation does not lead to any absurd result.97 Where the language is
ambiguous, courts may assess congressional intent—usually by examining the legislative
history.98 The Bankruptcy Code should not be interpreted to erode past bankruptcy practice
absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure.99
Because the two interpretations are binary in nature and because section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) only applies in circumstances in which an individual debtor attempts to
cram down unsecured creditors while retaining pre-petition property,100 the salient facts in
each of the cases are essentially identical. In each, individual debtors filed for chapter 11 and
attempted to cram down unsecured creditors. Debtors relied on the cram down provisions

92E.g.,

In re Steedley, No. 09-50654, 2010 WL 3528599, at *1-3 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2010); In re
Tegeder, 369 B.R. 477, 479-80 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007).
93 Compare In re Maharaj, 61 F.3d at 568-69, In re Lindsey, 453 B.R. at 892-94, and In re Gbadebo, 431
B.R. at 230, with In re Friedman, 466 B.R. at 480-82, Shat, 424 B.R. at 864-65, and In re Roedemeier,
374 B.R. at 273-74.
94 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (citing Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) (“The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of § 506(b)
begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”); see also Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The starting point
in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.”). See generally NORMAN J.
SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (7th ed. 2007) (treatise on
the principles of statutory interpretation).
95 Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 56 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
96 See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“[F]or
where, as here, the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according
to its terms.’”).
97 Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union
Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (“It is well established that ‘when the statute’s language is
plain, the sole function of the courts-at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is
to enforce it according to its terms.’”); see also Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 490 (“In other words, the language
being plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the sole evidence of
the ultimate legislative intent.”).
98 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992) (“But, given the ambiguity here, to attribute to
Congress the intention . . . without the new remedy’s being mentioned somewhere in the Code itself
or in the annals of Congress is not plausible, in our view, and is contrary to basic bankruptcy
principles.”).
99 Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2473 (2010) (“Pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice is telling
because we will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear
indication that Congress intended such a departure.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100 See cases cited supra notes 84 and 89.
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in section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) because the proposed plans failed to pay dissenting unsecured
creditors in full according to section 1129(b)(2)(B)(i).
C.

Summary of Broad View Analyses

The first courts to address the issue adopted the broad view.101 Once the majority,
the broad view has recently fallen out of favor with bankruptcy courts.102 Seven courts have
adopted the broad view as of June 30, 2012.103 The following sections summarize the
analyses used by broad view courts.
Clear and Unambiguous Language
The courts in In re Tegeder, In re Biggins, and In re Friedman found the language of
section 1115 to be clear and unambiguous.104 The Tegeder court relied solely on scholarly
commentary to support its decision.105 The court in Biggins, after briefly acknowledging
disagreement among courts, determined the language at issue to be unambiguous.106 The
only court to give analysis as to why the language at issue is unambiguous was the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Friedman.107 The Friedman majority
reasoned that the plain language, when read in context with the rest of the Bankruptcy Code,
does not require the application of an absolute priority rule.108 Congress borrowed language
from chapter 13 in adopting BAPCPA's individual debtor chapter 11 provisions.109 Chapter
See In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010); In re Johnson, 402 B.R. 851 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
2009); In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. 477 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007); In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. 264 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 2007); In re Bullard, 358 B.R. 541 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007).
102 See In re Arnold, 471 B.R. 578 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2012); In re Kamell, 451 B.R. 505, 512 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 2011); In re Lindsey, 453 B.R. 886, 905 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2011).
103 See In re Friedman, 466 B.R. at 482; Biggins, 465 B.R. at 322; In re Shat, 424 B.R. at 865; In re
Johnson, 402 B.R. at 852; In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. at 480; In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. at 276; In re
Bullard, 358 B.R. at 544.
104 In re Friedman, 466 B.R. at 482 (“A plain reading of §§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and 1115 together
mandates that the absolute priority rule is not applicable in individual chapter 11 debtor cases.”);
Biggins, 465 B.R. at 322 (“The Court reaches this conclusion not by analyzing the legislative history of
the relevant statutes, as the Shat and Gelin courts did, but by focusing on the statutes’ plain
language.”); In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. at 480 (“Thus, § 1115 is clear that property of the estate in a case
in which the debtor is an individual includes the property described in § 541 . . . as well as postpetition property and earnings.”). Roedemeier may also fit into this category, although it is unclear. See
In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. at 276.
105 In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. at 480. See WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., 4 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW &
PRACTICE § 84A:1 (2d ed., Westlaw Mar. 2007); W. HOMER DRAKE, JR., BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE FOR
THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER § 12:27 n.28 (Westlaw Sept. 2006); ROSEMARY E. WILLIAMS, 3
BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE HANDBOOK § 14:152 n.1 (2d ed., Westlaw June 2006).
106 Biggins, 465 B.R. at 320-23.
107 In re Friedman, 466 B.R. at 480-82.
108 Id. at 483 (“Finally, a plain reading of §§ 1129 and 1115 demonstrates that, just as in chapter 13, to
confirm a plan does not require the application of an absolute priority rule.”).
109 Id.
101
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13 has no absolute priority rule equivalent; therefore, Congress intended to abrogate the
absolute priority rule.110 Furthermore, the new disposable income requirement of section
1129(a)(15), which closely resembles the disposable income requirement of section
1325(b)(1), negated the need for the absolute priority rule.111
Congressional Intent–Making Chapter 11 Similar to Chapter 13
Conversely, the court in Shat found the language at issue to be ambiguous.112 When
read together, the phrase “property included in the estate under section 1115” could be read
broadly to include section 541 or narrowly to include only property added to the estate by
section 1115(a)(1)-(2). Both Shat and the Friedman majority found the legislative history to be
unhelpful in ascertaining congressional intent.113
Instead, broad view courts ascertained Congress’ intent by comparing BAPCPA
amendments to the rest of the Bankruptcy Code.114 The similarities between BAPCPA
amendments and certain chapter 13 provisions demonstrated that Congress intended to
bring individual chapter 11 cases more in line with chapter 13.115 Courts looked to the
following changes made to chapter 11 by BAPCPA:

In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. at 276.
In re Friedman, 466 B.R. at 483 (“As in Chapter 13, the disposable income requirement insures that
the individual debtor is required to dedicate all of his or her disposable income over a designated time
period (three or five years in Chapter 13, at least five years in chapter 11) to plan payments directed to
unsecured creditors.”).
112 In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 863-64 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
113 Both Shat and the Friedman majority expressed skepticism that intent could accurately be inferred
from BAPCPA’s legislative history. Shat followed a detailed synopsis of BAPCPA’s legislative history
with the following statement: “This analysis [of BAPCPA’s legislative history] indicates that, although
not entirely free from doubt, it appears that Congress inserted the individual chapter 11 provisions to
ensure no easy escape from means testing.” In re Shat, 424 B.R. at 862. Similarly, the Friedman
majority stated:
Much time has been spent by jurists and scholars on the legislative history,
congressional intent, and other speculations surrounding the applicability of the
absolute priority rule in individual debtor chapter 11 cases. . . . [T]hese decisions
and articles have undertaken a titanic effort to frame their outcomes on what may
be a very weak universe of original resources.
In re Friedman, 466 B.R. at 482-83.
114 In re Friedman, 466 B.R. at 483 (“[T]he Bankruptcy Code, as the main resource, does provide
significant assistance.”); In re Shat, 424 B.R. at 864-65 (“In determining the appropriate sense of the
words Congress chose, it is appropriate to investigate the context in which English and the
Bankruptcy Code employs the same or similar words.”); see also In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. at 275-76.
115 In re Friedman, 466 B.R. at 484 (“However, clearly, the drafters of § 1129(a)(15) tried to create
symmetry between chapters 11 and 13 for individual debtors.”); In re Shat, 424 B.R. at 868 (“Here,
given the host of change to chapter 11 with respect to individuals, all made with the goal of shaping
an individual’s chapter 11 case to look like a chapter 13 case . . . this court concludes that the broader
interpretation is the proper one.”); In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. at 275-76 (“Many of the BAPCPA’s
changes to Chapter 11 apply only to individual debtors and are clearly drawn from the Chapter 13
110
111
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property of the estate in chapter 11 now includes post-commencement property
and earnings;116
earnings from personal services by the debtor, or other future income of the
debtor, must go towards paying creditors;117
individual debtors must contribute all of their projected disposable income for
at least five years towards paying dissenting, unsecured creditors;118

model . . . . Taken together, these changes indicate Congress intended to extend the exemption from
the absolute priority rule to individual Chapter 11 debtors as well.”).
116 Compare § 1115, with § 1306.
(a) In a case in which the debtor is an individual, property of the estate includes, in
addition to the property specified in section 541—
(1) all property of the kind specified in section 541 that the debtor
acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is
closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13,
whichever occurs first; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the
commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or
converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13, whichever occurs first.
(b) Except as provided in section 1104 or a confirmed plan or order confirming a
plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 1115 (2012).
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in section
541 of this title—
(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that the debtor
acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is
closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this
title, whichever occurs first; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the
commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or
converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever
occurs first.
(b) Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order confirming a plan, the debtor
shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.
Id. § 1306.
117 Compare § 1123(a)(8), with § 1322(a)(1).
[I]n a case in which the debtor is an individual, provide for the payment to
creditors under the plan of all or such portion of earnings from personal services
performed by the debtor after the commencement of the case or other future
income of the debtor as is necessary for the execution of the plan.
Id. § 1123(a)(8).
[The plan] shall provide for the submission of all or such portion of future earnings
or other future income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee
as is necessary for the execution of the plan;
Id. § 1322(a)(1).
118 Compare § 1129(a)(15), with § 1325(b)(1).
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individual debtors should not receive a discharge until all plan payments are
completed;119
individual debtors may receive a discharge for cause before all payments are
completed;120 and

In a case in which the debtor is an individual and in which the holder of an allowed
unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan—
(A) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of the property to be
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
amount of such claim; or
(B) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan is not less
than the projected disposable income of the debtor (as defined in section
1325 (b)(2)) to be received during the 5-year period beginning on the date
that the first payment is due under the plan, or during the period for
which the plan provides payments, whichever is longer.
Id. § 1129(a)(15).
If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the
confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the
effective date of the plan—
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account
of such claim is not less than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income
to be received in the applicable commitment period beginning on the date
that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make
payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.
Id. § 1325(b)(1).
119 Compare § 1141(d)(5)(A), with § 1328(a).
[U]nless after notice and a hearing the court orders otherwise for cause,
confirmation of the plan does not discharge any debt provided for in the plan until
the court grants a discharge on completion of all payments under the plan . . . .
Id. § 1141(d)(5)(A).
Subject to subsection (d), as soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of
all payments under the plan, and in the case of a debtor who is required by a
judicial or administrative order, or by statute, to pay a domestic support obligation,
after such debtor certifies that all amounts payable under such order or such statute
that are due on or before the date of the certification (including amounts due
before the petition was filed, but only to the extent provided for by the plan) have
been paid, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the
debtor after the order for relief under this chapter, the court shall grant the debtor
a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of
this title . . . .
Id. § 1328(a).
120 Compare § 1141(d)(5)(B), with § 1328(b).
[A]t any time after the confirmation of the plan, and after notice and a hearing, the
court may grant a discharge to the debtor who has not completed payments under
the plan if—
(i) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property actually
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is
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individual debtors’ plans are permitted to be modified even after the plan has
been substantially consummated.121

In many cases, the BACPA amendments match the corresponding chapter 13
provisions word for word.122 BAPCPA imported chapter 13 concepts into individual

not less than the amount that would have been paid on such claim if the
estate of the debtor had been liquidated under chapter 7 on such date;
(ii) modification of the plan under section 1127 is not practicable; and
(iii) subparagraph (C) permits the court to grant a discharge . . . .
Id. § 1141(d)(5)(B).
Subject to subsection (d), at any time after the confirmation of the plan and after
notice and a hearing, the court may grant a discharge to a debtor that has not
completed payments under the plan only if—
(1) the debtor’s failure to complete such payments is due to circumstances
for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable;
(2) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property actually
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is
not less than the amount that would have been paid on such claim if the
estate of the debtor had been liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on
such date; and
(3) modification of the plan under section 1329 of this title is not
practicable.
Id. § 1328(b).
121 Compare § 1127(e), with § 1329(a).
If the debtor is an individual, the plan may be modified at any time after
confirmation of the plan but before the completion of payments under the plan,
whether or not the plan has been substantially consummated, upon request of the
debtor, the trustee, the United States trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured
claim, to—
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular
class provided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time period for such payments; or
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is
provided for by the plan to the extent necessary to take account of any
payment of such claim made other than under the plan.
Id. § 1127(e).
At any time after confirmation of the plan but before the completion of payments
under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon request of the debtor, the trustee,
or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, to—
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular
class provided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments;
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is
provided for by the plan to the extent necessary to take account of any
payment of such claim other than under the plan . . . .
Id. § 1329(a).
122 See supra notes 116-21.
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chapter 11 cases; by extension, individuals should be exempt from the absolute priority rule
because chapter 13 has no such requirement.123
Historical Perspectives on the Absolute Priority Rule
Courts’ past treatments of the absolute priority rule were critical in interpreting §
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).124 The Friedman majority was quick to point out that the absolute priority
rule is something of a misnomer in that the rule has never been absolute.125 As the Friedman
court noted, “courts have always reviewed § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) through the lens of common
sense and have approached legislative interpretation in a way to facilitate the goals of the
statute.”126 Federal courts have been tinkering with the absolute priority rule since its
inception in the early twentieth-century.127 To illustrate this point, the Friedman majority
cited to Supreme Court cases involving the new value exception to show how the Court has
modified the absolute priority rule over time.128 Courts have historically modified the
absolute priority rule to facilitate the goals of the individual statutes.129 Excepting individuals
out of the absolute priority rule seems far less dramatic after considering the many
exceptions made to the rule over the past seventy years.130

In re Friedman, 466 B.R. 471, 483 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 479 (“Two points are to be drawn here. First, courts have always reviewed § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
through the lens of common sense and have approached legislative interpretation in a way to facilitate
the goals of the statute. . . .”).
125 Id. at 478 (“An interesting feature of the absolute priority rule, even before enactment of the
BAPCPA amendment to § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), is that the rule has never been absolute.”).
126 Id. at 479.
127 John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 969 (1989) (“[The
absolute priority rule] is statutory only incidentally and belatedly. To Justice White, the issue in Ahlers
turned on the language of the Bankruptcy Code. But the Code’s language must be read under layers of
case law that run back more than 100 years.”); see also Brunstad, supra note 45, at 1497-502.
128 The Friedman majority referenced the following cases: Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union
Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926) (recognizing, in dicta, “that a new, substantial, and necessary
contribution could allow an old equity holder to retain an interest in the reorganized debtor”); Case v.
L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) (confirming and clarifying the new value corollary); In re
Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890, 265 F.3d 869, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that “the absolute priority rule [does] not apply to organizations where [the organization’s] members
did not hold ‘equity interests’ in the entity” despite the fact that the term “equity interest” does not
appear in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)); In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 72 F.3d 1305, 1315 (7th Cir. 1995)
(stating that control alone, divorced from any right to share in corporate profits or assets, does not
amount to an equity interest). Id. at 478-79.
129 Id.
130 See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 89, at § 58 (discussing the influence of “liberal” and “strict”
attitudes toward statutory interpretation).
123
124
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D.

Summary of Narrow View Analyses

Currently in the majority, the narrow view has steadily gained traction since In re
Gbadebo first adopted the narrow view in 2010.131 Sixteen courts have adopted the narrow
view as of June 30, 2012.132 The following sections summarize the analyses used by narrow
view courts.
Plain or Ambiguous Language
Some narrow view courts found the language to be clear133 while others found it to
be ambiguous.134 Many of these courts provided no analysis and instead referenced other
court opinions.135 Two courts reasoned the ambiguity to be self-evident due to the split in
opinion by the several courts.136 Ambiguity is often in the eye of the beholder and is in
many ways a subjective undertaking not prone to technical analysis.137 This, however, has
not stopped one court from attempting such an endeavor.
The Arnold court devoted over 2,200 words to a grammatical deconstruction of the
relevant provisions.138 The grammatical question at issue was whether the phrase “in
431 B.R. 222 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010).
In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 2012), aff’g 449 B.R. 484 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009); In re Arnold,
471 B.R. 578 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2012); In re Lively, 467 B.R. 884 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012); In re Tucker,
No. BR–67281, 2011 WL 5926757 (Bankr. D. Or. Nov. 28, 2011); In re Borton, No. 09-00196-TLM,
2011 WL 5439285 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011); In re Lindsey, 453 B.R. 886 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2011); In re
Kamell, 451 B.R. 505 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011); In re Draiman, 450 B.R. 777 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011); In
re Walsh, 447 B.R. 45 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011); In re Stephens, 445 B.R. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); In
re Karlovich, 456 B.R. 677 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010); In re Steedley, No. 09-50654, 2010 WL 3528599
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010); In re Gelin, 437 B.R. 435 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010); In re Mullins, 435 B.R. 352
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 2010); In re Gbadebo, 431 B.R. 222.
133 See Arnold, 471 B.R. at 606-07; Tucker, 2011 WL 5926757 at *2; Borton, 2011 WL 5439285 at *4;
Draiman, 450 B.R. at 821; Karlovich, 456 B.R. at 681; Steedley, 2010 WL 3528599 at *2; Mullins, 435 B.R.
at 360.
134 In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d 558, 568 (4th Cir. 2012).
135 E.g., Tucker, 2011 WL 5926757 at *2; Borton, 2011 WL 5439285 at *4; Draiman, 450 B.R. at 821;
Steedley, 2010 WL 3528599 at *2.
136 Arnold, 471 B.R. at 598-99 (quoting In re Lindsey, 453 B.R. 886, 903 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2011))
(“Thus, the court agrees with the court in Lindsey, which concluded that ‘it is axiomatic that the
language of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1115 is ambiguous, otherwise there would be no split of
authority and the arguments in favor of each position so diverse.’”).
137 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 94, at § 45:2 (“Ambiguity exists when a statute is capable of being
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses. However, this rule
is deceptive in that it implies that words have intrinsic meanings.”); see also Samuel R. Feldman, Not-SoGreat Weight: Treaty Deference and the Article 10(a) Controversy, 51 B.C. L. REV. 797, 824 (2010) (“As other
scholars have noted, ambiguity is in the eye of the beholder.”).
138 Arnold, 471 B.R. at 596-607. Arnold was decided after the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) of
the Ninth Circuit decided Friedman. In re Friedman, 466 B.R. 471 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012). While BAP
decisions are influential, they are not binding on a bankruptcy court like a district court ruling or a
Ninth Circuit opinion. Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990). As
131
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addition to property specified in section 541” is an adjectival phrase or an adverbial
phrase.139 After going through a grammatical analysis of the relevant provisions, the court in
Arnold found the phrase to be an adverbial one because “it modifies the verb, ‘includes,’ to
explain to what extent ‘property of the estate’ is included under § 1115(a).”140
Narrow view courts were skeptical that Congress would abrogate the absolute
priority rule in such a complicated and strained way.141 The Gelin court, for example,
reasoned that “[i]f Congress meant to eliminate the absolute priority rule of §
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) for individual debtors, it could have simply stated that § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) is
inapplicable in a case in which the debtor is an individual.”142 Likewise, “Congress could
have [abrogated the rule] in a far less awkward and convoluted manner by simply raising the
Chapter 13 debt limits and making additional individuals eligible to proceed under that
chapter.”143 With so many clearer, easier, and more direct ways for Congress to have done
away with the rule, it seemed strange that the operative language would reside as an
unenumerated phrase in section 1115. 144

an Article I court, the BAP is not binding on the federal district courts that must be free to formulate
their own rules within their jurisdiction. Id. Ninth Circuit bankruptcy courts are divided as to
whether BAP decisions are binding on them. See Arnold, 471 B.R. at 589 (listing cases and
commentary evidencing that bankruptcy courts of the circuit are divided as to whether BAP decisions
are binding on them). Because of this, the court in Arnold was able to diverge from the BAP’s holding
in Friedman.
139 Arnold, 471 B.R. at 602.
140 Id.
141 In re Kamell, 451 B.R. 505, 508 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (“[the broad] reading seems rather
convoluted and strained considering the language”); In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 867 (Bankr. D. Nev.
2010) (“It essentially reads the absolute priority rule out of individual chapter 11 cases, but does so in
a convoluted manner—arguably indicative that Congress did not fully appreciate the effect of the
language it chose.”); In re Gelin, 437 B.R. 435, 442 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (“[W]ith all due respect,
this Court can hardly imagine a more convoluted way of eliminating the absolute priority rule than
that proposed by Shat, Roedemeier, and Tegeder.”).
142 Gelin, 437 B.R. at 442.
143 In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d 558, 573 (4th Cir. 2012); see also In re Mullins, 435 B.R. 352, 360-61 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 2010) (“[I]t would have been much clearer, easier and more direct for it to have said simply
in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) ‘except that in a case in which the debtor is an individual, this provision shall not
apply’ . . .”).
144 Arnold, 471 B.R. at 603 (“If Congress had intended for § 1115 to subsume or supplant § 541, it
could have added § 541 to the enumerated items on the list in § 1115(a).”); Gelin, 437 B.R. at 442 (“If
Congress meant to eliminate the absolute priority rule of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) for individual debtors, it
could have simply stated that § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) is inapplicable in a case in which the debtor is an
individual . . . . If Congress truly meant to exempt an individual debtor’s entire estate, it likely would
have referred to both §§ 541 and 1115.”).
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Legislative History and Congressional Intent
Narrow view courts also found the legislative history of BAPCPA to be unhelpful in
divining congressional intent.145 The House Judiciary Committee Report simply restated the
statutory language146 and provided no additional insights.147 With no guidance regarding the
specific statutes at issue, courts looked to the general themes of BAPCPA. 148 Allowing
individual debtors to retain prepetition property–potentially leaving a smaller pot of property
for unsecured creditors to divvy up–would directly conflict with one of the central tenets of
BAPCPA: “that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford.”149
Narrow view courts were unconvinced that Congress intended to make individual
chapter 11s similar to chapter 13. While BAPCPA may have added language to chapter 11
that was almost identical to language found in chapter 13,150 abrogating the absolute priority
rule was an extrapolation too far.151 Including post-petition income into the bankruptcy
estate in order to maximize payouts to unsecured creditors was the end goal of BAPCPA;

Maharaj, 681 F.3d at 572 (“As many courts in a variety of contexts have noted, BAPCPA’s
legislative history is sparse.”); In re Draiman, 450 B.R. 777, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (“There is no
relevant legislative history on § 1115 which would indicate its intent was to abolish the absolute
priority rule.”); Kamell, 451 B.R. at 509 (“Moreover, the legislative history is also scarce, equivocal and
altogether unhelpful.”); In re Lindsey, 453 B.R. 886, 903 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2011) (“There is also no
dispute that the legislative history for BAPCPA is sparse, at best, and provides no real assistance in
this instance.”); Gelin, 437 B.R. at 441 (“The legislative history on § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) is unhelpful to
this end. As each of the bankruptcy courts above noted, the legislative history is entirely silent as to
whether the drafters of the amendment to § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) intended to wholly except individual
Chapter 11 debtors from the absolute priority rule.”).
146 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 80 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 147.
147 Arnold, 471 B.R. at 607 (“Thus, the legislative history specifically referencing the addition of § 1115
and the amendment of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) in BAPCPA as reflected in the House committee report is
unhelpful because it simply restates the statutory language.”).
148 In re Friedman, 466 B.R. at 490 (Jury, J., dissenting) (citing In re Kamell, 451 B.R. at 508); Arnold,
471 B.R. at 609; see also Lindsey, 453 B.R. at 904-905; In re Gbadebo, 431 B.R. 222, 229 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 2005).
149 Maharaj, 681 F.3d at 574 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 2 (2005) reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
88,89). See also Friedman, 466 B.R. at 485 (Jury, J. dissenting) (“[T]he policy behind the enactment of
BAPCPA was to enhance the return to creditors.”); Arnold, 2012 WL 1820877 (“[B]ased on this
legislative history, it is incongruous to conclude that Congress intended to relax plan confirmation
standards for individual Chapter 11 debtors by removing the creditor protection of the absolute
priority rule and thereby allowing these debtors to retain their prepetition assets and cram down
unsecured creditors.”); Kamell, 451 B.R. at 508 (“[I]n general, BAPCPA has been read to tighten, not
loosen, the ability of debtors to avoid paying what can reasonably be paid on account of debt.”);
Gbadebo, 431 B.R. at 229 (“Each one of these new provisions appears designed to impose greater
burdens on individual chapter 11 debtor’s rights so as to ensure a greater payout to creditors.”).
150 See supra notes 104-09.
151 See Kamell, 451 B.R. at 508 n.4 (playing off of the phrase “a bridge too far”).
145
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using language similar to that found in chapter 13 was merely a means to do so.152 If
Congress’s intent had been to make chapter 11 like chapter 13, then “Congress would simply
have amended the statutory debt ceilings for Chapter 13 cases set out in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e),
and either eliminate them altogether or set them much higher.”153
Canon Against Implied Repeal
Courts also looked to pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice to resolve the issue.154 The
Bankruptcy Code should not be “read to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear
indication that Congress intended such a departure.”155 Adoption of the broad view would
represent a significant departure from pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice.156 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in In re Maharaj, was especially sensitive to
this issue, repeatedly emphasizing the canon against implied repeal.157 The canon against
implied repeal requires “clear indication” on the part of Congress to overturn a preexisting
bankruptcy practice.158 The Maharaj court found no such indication in the plain language of
section 1115 or section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).159 The lack of legislative history was fatal to the
broad view for two reasons. First, Congress did discuss in BAPCPA’s legislative history
Arnold, 471 B.R. at 611 (“This interpretation is not supported by the structure of the statutory
language as discussed above, nor is it supported in the legislative history of BAPCPA, which shows
the purpose was to require debtors to pay more.”).
153 In re Karlovich, 456 B.R. 677, 682 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010).
154 Maharaj, 681 F.3d at 571 (quoting Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S.Ct. 2464, 2467 (2010)) (“The canon
against implied repeal is particularly strong in the field of bankruptcy law. In interpreting the Code,
we are mindful that courts ‘will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice
absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure.’“); Arnold, 2012 WL 1820877
(quoting Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S.Ct. 2464, 2473(2010)) (“For example, with respect to BAPCPA
Chapter 13 amendments, the Supreme Court has stated that it ‘will not read the Bankruptcy Code to
erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure.’“);
Kamell, 451 B.R. at 509-10 (“It has long been held that major changes to existing practice will not be
inferred unless clearly mandated.”).
155 Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2473; see also Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549
U.S. 443, 453 (2007) (quoting FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003))
(“‘[W]here Congress has intended to provide . . . exceptions to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it
has done so clearly and expressly.’”); Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 539 (2004) (“It is fair to doubt
that Congress would so rework their longstanding role without announcing the change in the
congressional record.”).
156 See Maharaj, 681 B.R. at 570 (“Debtors concede that adoption of their position would represent a
significant departure from pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice.”).
157 Id. at 570-71.
158 Id. at 570 (“Strongly supporting our conclusion that the BAPCPA amendments did not abrogate
the absolute priority rule is the Supreme Court’s view, especially in the bankruptcy context, that
implied repeal is strongly disfavored. Indeed, Debtors concede that adoption of their position would
represent a significant departure from pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice.”).
159 Id. at 572 (“Similarly, there is simply no clear indication from the language of either §§
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) or 1115 that Congress intended such a dramatic departure from pre-BAPCPA
bankruptcy practice. . . . Furthermore, there is nothing in the BAPCPA’s legislative history that
suggests that Congress intended to repeal the absolute priority rule.”).
152
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instances where BAPCPA would change longstanding bankruptcy practice, but in the section
of the legislative history applicable to section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), Congress made no mention
of abrogating the absolute priority rule.160 Second, the previous treatment of the absolute
priority rule by Congress supports the narrow view. When Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Act in 1952 to eliminate the fair and equitable requirement, it clearly explained
its actions in the accompanying legislative history.161 If Congress had meant to eliminate the
rule, it would have explained its intent, just as it had done before in 1952.162 The canon
against implied repeal mandates the adoption of the narrow view because the legislative
history reveals no clear intention by Congress to eliminate it.
E.

Courts Should Adopt the Narrow View

Both the ill will against BAPCPA held by many in the legal profession163 and
BAPCPA’s shoddy drafting164 provide important context in understanding the issue. While
Id. (citations omitted) (“Congress does discuss in the BAPCPA legislative history instances where
BAPCPA changes longstanding bankruptcy practice. But in the section of the legislative history
appearing beneath the label ‘Consumer Creditor Bankruptcy Protections’ there is simply no mention
whatsoever of abrogation of the absolute priority rule. This Congressional silence is telling.”).
161 Id. at 572-73 (quoting H.R. NO. 82-2320 (1952) reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1960, 1981-82)
(alterations in original) (“Not only did Congress amend the Act to state that plan confirmation shall
not be refused because ‘the interest of a debtor…will be preserved under the arrangement,’ but
Congress explained itself in the Congressional Record: ‘[T]he fair and equitable rule…cannot
realistically be applied[.]’”).
162 Id. at 573.
163 See Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 652-53 (D. Minn. 2007) (“The Court understands the
bankruptcy court’s frustration with the BAPCPA, which is a poorly written statute; however, the
Court’s task is to interpret the statute as Congress has written it.”); In re Phillips, 362 B.R. 284, 295
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (“The provisions of BAPCPA have drawn the ire of a number of reviewing
courts since its enactment.”); In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (“Unfortunately,
the BAPCPA amendments do not provide a clear answer. The amendments are confusing,
overlapping, and sometimes self-contradictory. They introduce new and undefined terms that
resemble, but are different from, established terms that are well understood. Furthermore, the new
provisions address some situations that are unlikely to arise. Deciphering this puzzle is like trying to
solve a Rubik’s Cube that arrived with a manufacturer’s defect. Fortunately, after many twists and
turns, a few patches of solid color emerge.”); Braucher, supra note 75, at 457 n.3 (“Because it is so
complex and badly drafted and makes so many dubious policy choices, experts have taken to calling it
by the fanciful acronym BARF (BAnkruptcy ReForm Act).”); David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The
Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 227 (2007) (“To be sure,
BAPCPA adds a great amount of detail and is rife with bad draftsmanship, dumbfounding
contradictions, and curious, even comical, special interest exceptions. It is hard to choke out any
words of admiration for the quality of BAPCPA’s draftsmanship. Judges and scholars have not
hesitated to pour scorn on Congress for the details of BAPCPA.”); Catherine E. Vance & Corinne
Cooper, Nine Traps and One Slap: Attorney Liability Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
283, 284 (“We’ve known it for eight years. It’s a behemoth of bad policy, an illiteracy of ill-conceived
provisions, an underbelly of unintended consequences. The problems we know about are bad enough.
The problems we haven’t yet discovered are likely to be worse.”).
160
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one of BAPCPA’s stated purposes was to “ensure that the [bankruptcy] system is fair for
both debtors and creditors,”165 BAPCPA was a considerably pro-creditor piece of legislation
due to the strong backing it received from the consumer credit industry.166 One need not
hold pro-debtor views to hold BAPCPA in disfavor; BAPCPA’s hanging paragraphs,167
ambiguous language,168 and onerous procedures169 have caused the bar and bench
See In re Miller, 570 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2009) (“BAPCPA has been criticized by some judges
and commentators as being ‘poorly drafted’ and has resulted in certain readings of the Code that
would qualify as ‘awkward’ under the definition in Lamie.”); In re Graupner, 537 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th
Cir. 2008) (“Although the hanging paragraph has caused significant confusion and incoherence in the
law and has been rightly criticized for its poor drafting, its legislative history leaves little doubt that its
architects intended only good things for car lenders and other lienholders.”) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); In re Reyes, 361 B.R. 276, 279 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, No. 07-20689-CIV, 2007 WL 6082567 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2007) (“So, while the experts
who drafted BAPCA are entitled to a failing grade in Legislative Drafting 101, the Court is left to
determine what Congress intended.”); Oversight of the Implementation of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention &
Consumer Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 34, 191 (2006) (“The [National Bankruptcy Conference] concurs with the
witnesses that the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (‘BAPCPA’)
contains errors that should be promptly addressed in a ‘technical corrections bill.’”); Ralph Brubaker,
Consumer Credit and Bankruptcy: Assessing A New Paradigm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (“Markell provides a
case study in the dreadfully inept legislative drafting on display in BAPCPA.”); Henry J. Sommer,
Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191 (2005) (“One of the chief problems that
will be confronted is [BAPCPA’s] atrocious drafting, especially in many of the consumer provisions of
the bill.”).
165 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 1 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89 (emphasis added).
166 Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1297 (“Although the hanging paragraph has caused significant confusion and
incoherence in the law and has been rightly criticized for its poor drafting, its legislative history leaves
little doubt that its architects intended only good things for car lenders and other lienholders.”)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 486 (2005)
(“The establishment of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission in 1994 either intentionally or
unintentionally galvanized the consumer creditor community and ultimately became the impetus for
BAPCPA.”); Keith M. Lundin, Ten Principles of BAPCPA: Not What Was Advertised, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., Sept. 2005, at 1 (“[L]obbyists and executives for the consumer credit industry convinced Congress
that abuse was rampant in bankruptcy, that many debtors were using bankruptcy as a ‘first resort’ to
avoid paying creditors, and that courts weren’t doing enough to police the bankruptcy system.”);
Sommer, supra note 164, at 191-92 (“In contrast to the 1978 legislation, which was crafted with
extensive assistance from many of the finest minds in the bankruptcy world, many of the consumer
provisions of the 2005 legislation were largely drafted by lobbyists with limited knowledge of real-life
consumer bankruptcy practice.”).
167 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012).
168 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(c)(3)(A)-(B); In re Curry, 362 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007)
(“Since [§ 362(c)(3)(A)] has no ‘plain and unambiguous meaning,’ it has no plain meaning to be
followed.”); In re Paschal, 337 B.R. 274, 277 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (“In an Act in which headscratching opportunities abound for both attorneys and judges alike, § 362(c)(3)(A) stands out.”); In re
Charles, 332 B.R. 538, 541 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (“The Court notes that the relevant provisions in
[§ 362(c)(3)(B)] are, at best, particularly difficult to parse and, at worst, virtually incoherent.”); see also
164
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considerable grief.170 Without guidance from Congress, keeping one’s personal views
separate from one’s objective analysis is difficult, because policy is all that remains after
every canon of statutory interpretation is exhausted.
Early courts that followed the narrow view may have been too quick to see
ambiguity where none existed. The initial deluge of bitter criticism171 may have put readers
on heightened alert, leading them to read ambiguity in places where none existed. This
appears to explain Tegeder, which was the first court to substantively deal with the issue,
because the court relied on scholarly material to justify its narrow reading of section 1115.172
Plain Reading Favors the Narrow View
A plain reading of section 1115 favors the narrow view. Read separately, sections
1115 and 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) are clear; it is only when the two are read together that ambiguities
possibly arise.173 A grammatical deconstruction of the language supports the narrow view. 174

Megan A. Taylor, Comment, Gag Me with A Rule of Ethics: BAPCPA’s Gag Rule and the Debtor Attorney’s
Right to Free Speech, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 227, 232 (2008) (“Another criticism of the BAPCPA
was that it was poorly drafted and that courts would face ‘interpretive challenges’ to its ambiguous
language. Much of the new legislation remains confusing even to seasoned bankruptcy attorneys and
judges.”).
169 See Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
349 (2008) (“Furthermore, the 2005 law has at least temporarily reduced access to bankruptcy because
of increased costs due to new uncertainty, paperwork and hoop-jumping.”); Joseph D. Orenstein,
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States: "In Contemplation of" the Meaning, Applicability, and
Validity of Attorney Restrictions in the BAPCPA, 62 MERCER L. REV. 685, 699-700 (2011) (“The
reluctance of bankruptcy attorneys was augmented by the general perception that BAPCPA was
poorly drafted and that the statutory overhaul left a maze of ambiguity and uncertainty for attorneys
to navigate. Chief among attorneys’ concerns was the specter of increased liability corresponding with
measures of BAPCPA designed to increase accountability.”); Vance & Cooper, supra note 163, at 284
(“This article cannot hope to alert lawyers to all the landmines of liability. We point out just enough to
terrify you so that you will peruse its provisions with the intensity of a soldier in a minefield.”).
170 Braucher, supra note 169, at 349 (“The legislation itself, however, is a defectively designed and
poorly drafted mess. It creates hundreds of difficult new issues that are now working their way up to
and through the appellate system.”); Taylor, supra note 168, at 232 (“Another criticism of the
BAPCPA was that it was poorly drafted and that courts would face ‘interpretive challenges’ to its
ambiguous language. Much of the new legislation remains confusing even to seasoned bankruptcy
attorneys and judges.”).
171 See supra note 163.
172 In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. 477, 480 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007) (“Although there do not appear to be any
reported decisions directly on point, several commentators agree with this conclusion.”).
173 See supra Part II.A.
174 In re Arnold, 471 B.R. 578, 603 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2012) (“[A] grammatical analysis of the statutory
language of § 1115 supports a narrow interpretation of the statute,…the grammatical analysis is in
addition to other methods of statutory construction that also show the narrow view is correct.”).
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The narrow view is further reinforced when examined in light of the entire Bankruptcy
Code.175
Using the rules of English grammar, the phrase “in addition to the property
specified in section 541” should be read as an adverbial phrase modifying the verb
“includes” and should not be read as being the object of the verb “includes.”176 The phrase
“in addition to the property specified in section 541” modifies the verb “includes” by
clarifying what sections 1115(a)(1)-(2) should be included into.177 The word “includes” is a
transitive verb, which requires a direct object.178 The direct objects are located in the two
enumerated subsections of sections 1115(a).
Reading the language in context with the entire bankruptcy code further supports
the narrow view. First, from a drafting perspective, why would a drafter do away with the
absolute priority rule in a section entitled “Property of the Estate”179 when one could just as
easily and more clearly accomplish the same effect by adding language to the sole subsection
that deals with cram downs?180 Second, the estate and property of the estate are defined and
created in section 541.181 Asking anyone familiar with the Bankruptcy Code about where to
locate the code's definition of "property of the estate" would likely produce an immediate
answer of section 541. It would be an odd thing to say that property of the estate is defined
in chapter 13 by section 1306 or that property of the estate is defined in chapter 12 by
section 1207.182 A more accurate statement would be that property of the estate is defined in
section 541, with sections 1115, 1207, and 1306 adding additional property to the estate in
each corresponding chapter.183 Moreover, section 103(a) provides that section 541 applies to

Examining certain provisions in light of the entire Bankruptcy Code is consistent with traditional
rules o statutory interpretation. See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at
issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in
isolation. The meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when
placed in context.”).
176 Arnold, 471 B.R. at 602 (“[T]he prepositional phrase, ‘in addition to the property specified in
section 541’ is an adverbial phrase because it modifies the verb, ‘includes,’ to explain to what extent
‘property of the estate’ is included under § 1115(a) . . . .”).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 11 U.S.C. § 1115 (2012).
180 See Florida Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (“To be sure, a
subchapter heading cannot substitute for the operative text of the statute. Nonetheless, statutory
titles and section headings are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a
statute.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
182 See In re Friedman, 466 B.R. 471, 484 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (Jury, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s
analysis would have us conclude that the definition of property of the estate found in § 541 and made
applicable to all chapters by § 103(a) has no meaning in individual chapter 11’s.”)
183 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 1115, 1207, 1306.
175

2013]

DOES THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE STILL APPLY

215

TO INDIVIDUAL CHAPTER 11 DEBTORS POST-BAPCPA?

a chapter 11 case,184 furthering the argument that section 1115 does not supersede section
541.
The narrow view also better harmonizes with the rest of the Bankruptcy Code.185
For example, section 1528 relies on the assumption that property of the estate is defined in
section 541 and not in sections 1115, 1207, or 1306. Section 1528 reads:
After recognition of a foreign main proceeding, a case under another
chapter of this title may be commenced only if the debtor has assets in the
United States. The effects of such case shall be restricted to the assets of
the debtor that are within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and
. . . to other assets of the debtor that are within the jurisdiction of the court under sections
541(a) of this title . . . to the extent that such other assets are not subject to
the jurisdiction and control of a foreign proceeding that has been
recognized under this chapter.186
If property of the estate is defined in section 1115 for chapter 11 cases, then the argument
could be made that a loophole exists in section 1528 where assets located outside of the
United States that are not subject to the jurisdiction and control of a foreign proceeding
would not be effected by an applicable chapter 11 case. Such an interpretation of section
1528 leads to an absurd result, and it is doubtful that such an argument would be persuasive
to a court. Still, section 1528 illustrates how the broad view would create dissonance with
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Courts should adopt the narrow view because the basic rules of English grammar
dictate a narrow reading of the statute. The fact that section 1115 enumerates two categories
of property but leaves the phrase referencing section 541 unenumerated is another telling
argument favoring the narrow view.187 Again, when read in context with the rest of the
Bankruptcy Code, the narrow view better harmonizes with other sections of the code.
Furthermore, because a narrow reading leads to no absurd results,188 the plain language of
section 1115 should govern.

11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“Except as provided in section 1161 of this title, chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this
title apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, and this chapter, sections 307, 362(n),
555 through 557, and 559 through 562 apply in a case under chapter 15.”).
185 See Friedman, 466 B.R. at 484-85 (Jury, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s] narrow reading of the
meaning of the terms ‘included’ and ‘in addition to’ by focusing solely on §§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and
1115 causes them to overlook one of the key tenets of statutory construction: that we are to read the
statute as a cohesive whole, giving all sections their due place and not creating an island of words that
floats independently of the integrated continent.”)
186 11 U.S.C. § 1528 (emphasis added).
187 In re Arnold, 471 B.R. 578, 603, 606-7 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2012).
188 Broad view courts made no mention of any absurd results that would result from a narrow reading
of § 1115(a).
184
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Congress’s Silence on the Matter Necessitates that the Pre-BAPCPA Practice Should Continue
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that it “will not read the Bankruptcy Code
to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a
departure.”189 If the language of a statute is ambiguous and Congress was unclear on the
matter, then courts should not depart from past bankruptcy practice.190 Prior to BAPCPA,
courts unanimously agreed that the absolute priority rule applied to individual debtors.191
Broad view courts would erode prior bankruptcy practice based on the assumption that
Congress intended to make chapter 11 more like chapter 13, thereby inferring the abrogation
of the absolute priority rule.192 Such an inference is hardly describable as a “clear indication
that Congress intended such a departure.”193 As the following section will explain, such an
assumption is unfounded due to the dearth of legislative history on the matter.
Sparse Legislative History Favors Neither View
Ordinarily, when the language of a statute has a plain and natural reading, no further
analysis is required.194 However, when enough courts create a split of authority, de facto
ambiguity may arise, and a treatment of the legislative history along with an assessment of
congressional intent may help to strengthen a plain and natural reading further.195 Such is
the situation here.
Regrettably, the legislative history surrounding BAPCPA is unhelpful in assessing
congressional intent.196 The House Judiciary Committee Report merely restates the language
of the provisions and provides no additional insight into Congress’s intentions regarding the
absolute priority rule.197 Likewise, the general purposes of BAPCPA are unhelpful in
resolving the issue in a dispositive manner. BAPCPA’s twofold purpose was to ensure that
debtors repay creditors the maximum they could afford and to implement additional
Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2473 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra
note 140 (listing bankruptcy cases that discuss the presumption against implied repeal).
190 See supra Part II.D.3.
191 See supra note 61.
192 In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d 558, 565-66 (4th Cir. 2012).
193 Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2473.
194 See supra note 96, 138.
195 See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 94, at § 45:6 (“In a case where a court is faced with a novel
question, it must seek to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature as it is expressed in
the statute itself.”).
196 In re McNabb, 326 B.R. 785, 789 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (“Legislative history is virtually useless as
an aid to understanding the language and intent of BAPCPA. The section-by-section analysis in the
Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary merely provides a gloss of the statutory language of
BAPCPA § 322. It does not provide an example of the kind of problem or abuse it was intended to
correct, nor a citation to a case whose result it sought to alter. Consequently it provides no clue to the
intended significance of the ‘as a result of electing’ language. Both the majority and the dissents to the
1997 Commission Report are similarly unhelpful as to the significance of this language.”).
197 See supra notes 146-47.
189
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consumer protection safeguards.198 Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) does not deal with consumer
protection safeguards, nor does it ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can
afford.199 Nothing in the statutes’ language or legislative history links any of BAPCPA’s
central goals to section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).200
However, the bankruptcy court in In re Shat identified a possible scrivener's error
that would link section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) to one of BAPCPA’s two goals.201 Currently,
section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) reads in part: “. . . except that in a case in which the debtor is an
individual, the debtor may retain property included in the estate under section 1115, subject to
the requirements of subsection (a)(14) of this section.”202 Subsection (a)(14) deals with the
requirement that domestic support obligations be current for a plan to be confirmed.203 Shat
explained that during the legislative process subsection (a)(14) in its current form was
inserted without updating the accompanying reference in section 1115.204 If this speculated
disconnect between references had been fixed, then section 1115 would have been updated
to refer to what is now subsection (a)(15).205 Section 1129(a)(15) effectively requires
individual debtors to apply all of their disposable income towards paying back creditors if an
unsecured claimholder objects to the confirmation of a plan.206 This appears to be a

The House Judiciary Committee Report stated the following regarding the purposes of BAPCPA:
PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
H.R. 333, the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005”, is a comprehensive package of reform measures pertaining to both
consumer and business bankruptcy cases. The purpose of the bill is to improve
bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the
bankruptcy system and by ensuring that the system is fair for both debtors and
creditors.
The heart of H.R. 333’s consumer bankruptcy reforms is the implementation of an
income/expense screening mechanism (“needs-based bankruptcy relief”) to ensure
that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford.
H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 2-3 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
199 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
200 See In re Kamell, 451 B.R. 505, 509 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011).
201 See In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 860 n. 21(Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
202 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (emphasis added).
203 Id. § 1129(a)(14) (“If the debtor is required by a judicial or administrative order, or by statute, to
pay a domestic support obligation, the debtor has paid all amounts payable under such order or such
statute for such obligation that first become payable after the date of the filing of the petition.”).
204 Shat, 424 B.R. at 860 n.21.
205 Id.
206 Section 1129(a)(15) states:
(15) In a case in which the debtor is an individual and in which the holder of an
allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan
(A) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of the property to be
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
amount of such claim; or
198
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legitimate scrivener's error considering that a disposable income requirement would be more
relevant to a cram down provision than a requirement ensuring timely domestic support
payments. This possible scrivener's error helps link section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) to one of the
main goals of BAPCPA–ensuring that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can
afford.207
Because BAPCPA generally attempted to maximize the amount paid to creditors,
the legislative history marginally favors the narrow view, which provides creditors with the
possibility of greater payments. Still, such a conclusion may be a stretch,208 especially when
the conclusion relies on a hypothesized scrivener's error.209 To assume that every provision
in BAPCPA was engineered to maximize payments to creditors, while mostly accurate, may
be too cynical. The idea that Congress intended to abrogate the absolute priority rule in an
effort to balance out the requirements found in section 1129(a)(15) is a facially valid
speculation given Congress’s silence on the issue. Accordingly, applying the general intent of
BAPCPA to section 1129(b)(2)(B(ii), while somewhat favoring the narrow view, leads to less
than dispositive results.
Likewise, it would be erroneous to conclude that Congress intended to make
chapter 11 cases similar to chapter 13 cases.210 Changes to the Bankruptcy Code should not
be read “to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended
such a departure.”211 Such is the case here.212 The narrow view embodies the pre-BAPCPA
(B) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan is not less
than the projected disposable income of the debtor (as defined in section
1325(b)(2)) to be received during the 5-year period beginning on the date
that the first payment is due under the plan, or during the period for
which the plan provides payments, whichever is longer.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15).
207 See supra note 197.
208 See In re Kamell, 451 B.R. 505, 508 n.4 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011).
209 See In re Lively, 467 B.R. 884, 890 n.3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012) (“One could easily assume that
Congress wished to protect domestic support creditors by not allowing a debtor to keep any
postpetition earnings . . . . Therefore, the Court may not correct the scrivener’s error.”).
210 See In re Miller, 570 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2009) (“BAPCPA has been criticized by some judges
and commentators as being ‘poorly drafted’ and has resulted in certain readings of the Code that
would qualify as ‘awkward’ under the definition in Lamie. Although we have no reason to pass
judgment on the process by which BAPCPA became law, we note that perceived poor drafting should
not be regarded as a license to invalidate plain-text readings in the name of fixing a statute that some
believe is broken.”).
211 Cohen v. Dela Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212 In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d 558, 570 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Strongly supporting our conclusion that the
BAPCPA amendments did not abrogate the absolute priority rule is the Supreme Court’s view,
especially in the bankruptcy context, that implied repeal is strongly disfavored.”); Kamell, 451 B.R. at
509-10 (“The court is not persuaded by this vague language that Congress meant to abrogate the
absolute priority rule out of individual chapter 11s entirely. The absolute priority rule has been a
mainstay of Chapter 11 and predecessor practice since at least the 1930’s. . . . It has long been held
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practice of applying the absolute priority rule to debtors’ prepetition property. Nowhere in
the legislative history does it mention that Congress intended to make individual chapter 11
cases more like chapter 13 cases.213 The intent of Congress was to ensure that debtors repay
creditors the maximum they can afford.214 While similarities exist between the chapter 11
plan confirmation process and the chapter 13 plan confirmation process, noteworthy
differences exist, and the circumstances that warrant different statutory schemes are
significant.215 In chapter 13, the court confirms the plan if it meets the requirements for
confirmation under section 1325.216 Creditors may object to confirmation of a chapter 13
plan, and the court can either sustain or overrule the objection.217 No voting by
claimholders takes place.218 Confirming a chapter 11 plan involves a very different
procedure. In chapter 11, claimholders vote on the plan.219 Claimholders are grouped into
classes based on the similarities of their claims.220 Each of the classes either accepts or
rejects the plan, and a class of impaired claimholders accepts the plan by a majority vote in
number of claims and at least two-thirds in dollar value.221 Cram down provisions are
necessary in chapter 11 because a single class of claimholders can derail a plan using the
voting power it holds. Because BAPCPA kept the voting scheme in place for individual
debtors, it would follow that Congress would keep the cram down provisions of section
1129(b)(2) intact as well. The goal of BAPCPA was to enlarge payouts to creditors, not to
harmonize the statutory schemes of chapter 11 and chapter 13.222 Broad view courts that
reasoned otherwise mistook the means for the ends.223
The only conclusion to draw from BAPCPA’s legislative history is that no
conclusion can be drawn from it.224 The House Judiciary Committee Report merely restates
that major changes to existing practice will not be inferred unless clearly mandated.”) (citations
omitted).
213 See In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 861 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
214 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 2-3 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
215 In re Friedman, 466 B.R. 471, 484 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (Jury, J., dissenting) (“[The majority]
would further have us conclude that one of the significant differences between chapter 11’s and
13’s—that classes of creditors are entitled to vote for or against confirmation in chapter 11’s whereas
no class vote exists in chapter 13’s—has little or no importance in an individual chapter 11.”)
216 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2010).
217 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015.
218 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.
21911 U.S.C. § 1126.
220 Id. § 1122.
221 Id. § 1126(c).
222 See supra note 198.
223 See supra note 144.
224 See Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 Bankruptcy Act: Resistance
Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93 (2007) (“[B]ecause the Act is badly designed and drafted,
bench and bar have had to struggle to attempt to achieve the legislation’s announced goals – abuse
prevention and consumer protection.”).
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the statutory language and provides no additional insights.225 To make broad assumptions
based on BAPCPA’s general goals or the similarity between the BAPCPA amendments and
chapter 13 provisions relies too much on speculation.226 While reasoned speculation is
arguably better than nothing, such speculation is not helpful here.227
III.

CONCLUSION

Instead of passing BAPCPA, Congress should have lifted the statutory debt caps 228
imposed on chapter 13 and barred individuals from filing under chapter 11 without a finding
of good cause instead of mixing elements of chapter 13 into chapter 11. However, Congress
passed BAPCPA with its susceptible language in sections 1115 and 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), and the
President signed it into law.229
Using the canons of statutory interpretation, a plain reading of section 1115 has the
absolute priority rule only applying to individual debtors’ pre-petition property.
Furthermore, the legislative history dealing with sections 1115 and 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) is
inadequate to assess Congress’s intent on the issue. Neither the broad goals of BAPCPA
nor the similarities between some BAPCPA amendments and certain chapter 13 provisions
provide clear indication of Congress’s position on the absolute priority rule as it applies to
individual debtors. The Bankruptcy Code should not be read to erode past bankruptcy
practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure.230 With no clear
indication from Congress on the issue, the pre-BAPCPA practice of applying the absolute
priority rule to individual debtors’ pre-petition property should continue.

H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 80 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 147.
See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
227 See supra Part III.E.2.
228 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2010).
229 See Bruce A. Markell, The Sub Rosa Subchapter: Individual Debtors in Chapter 11 After BAPCPA, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 70 (2007) (“As it is, however, one is left with a motley sub rosa subchapter, which
will generate wasted effort for lawyers and pain for debtors.”).
230 See supra note 211.
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